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NONCITIZENS’ RIGHTS IN THE
FACE OF PROLONGED
DETENTION:
JOHNSON V. ARTEAGA-MARTINEZ
SAMANTHA L. FAWCETT*

I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”), codified
in part at 8 U.S.C. § 1231, the federal government generally has ninety
days to successfully deport a detained noncitizen who has reentered
illegally after being removed once before.1 While exceptions to this
time limit exist, the United States Supreme Court determined in 2001
that detention under Section 1231 cannot be indefinite.2
Now, more than two decades later, the Court must elaborate
further. In Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez,3 the Court must decide how
long a detainment can last beyond the ninety-day statutory limit while
a detainee seeks relief from deportation through a procedure called a
‘withholding of removal’ (also known as “withholding-only relief”). An
immigration judge determines the outcome of a withholding of
removal claim, and if granted, withholding-only relief provides that a
person cannot be deported to their home country.4 To secure
withholding-only relief, a noncitizen must establish a fear of violence in
Copyright @ 2022 Samantha L. Fawcett
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1. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). As a general note, “alien” is used throughout the statutes and
cases at issue. In recognition of the dehumanization and harm the word inflicts, when not quoting
directly from another source, the author will use the words “noncitizen” or “individual.”
2. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
3. Arteaga-Martinez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, No. 19-1054, 2019 WL 13031922, 1 (3d
Cir. Aug. 20, 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. 920 (Aug. 23,
2021) (No. 19-896).
4. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNSEL AND NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER,
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL 2 (2020).
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their home country.5 Once established, the United States government
cannot deport the noncitizen to their home country without violating
the United Nations Convention against Torture.6
Arteaga-Martinez concerns a specific part of the INA, codified as
Section 1231, that allows the government to detain certain noncitizens
past the original ninety day removal period.7 In the 2001 case Zadvydas
v. Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 1231 implicitly does not
allow indefinite detention of a noncitizen.8 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court relied on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.9
Specifically, the Court held that, while the statute did not prescribe a
time frame for detention, serious constitutional concerns would arise
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause if the government
were to indefinitely hold a noncitizen.10 Because Section 1231 left room
for ambiguity, the Court was able to utilize a reading that avoided
consideration of whether the statute violated due process.
Noncitizens waiting for their withholding-only proceedings fall
under the purview of the Zadvydas rule.11 After Zadvydas, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) created a process for
those detained under Section 1231 with pending withholding-only
relief applications to apply for interim release.12 Recently, the Third and
Ninth Circuits both found that this DHS process violates Section 1231
because it does not provide the opportunity for an impartial hearing on
interim release after six months of detention.13 Though ArteagaMartinez directly concerns only whether the Third Circuit’s
interpretation is accurate, both Circuits will be affected by the decision
of the Court. Ultimately, the Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s
holding.14

5. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
6. Id.
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (allowing for the removal of a noncitizen “who has been
determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal.”).
8. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
9. Id. at 689.
10. Id. at 680.
11. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280 (2021) (holding that these
individuals fall under the purview of Section 1231).
12. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 241.13.
13. Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2018); Diouf
v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011).
14. The Supreme Court also granted certiorari this term to another case arising from the
Ninth Circuit that also concerns detention under Section 1231(a)(6). See generally Garland v.
Gonzalez, No. 20-322 (U.S. argued Jan. 11, 2022). Gonzalez additionally poses a question
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a citizen of Mexico who
has entered the United States four times.15 After living in the United
States for ten years,16 Arteaga-Martinez left to visit an ill family
member in Mexico.17 While there, Arteaga-Martinez and his family
were attacked by a criminal street gang, and he was beaten, robbed, and
had his car stolen.18 The gang left a note with a death threat, telling him
not to report them to the police.19 Fearful of further violence, ArteagaMartinez reentered the United States in 2012.20 He was apprehended
at the border and removed under an expedited removal order.21
However, Arteaga-Martinez alleges he reentered the United States
later that same year.22 In 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”), an agency within DHS, arrested and detained him.23
At the time of his arrest, Arteaga-Martinez had continuously lived
in the United States for nearly six years, had no criminal record other
than traffic violations, and was expecting the birth of his first child in
the United States.24 As an order of removal had previously been issued
against him,25 ICE reinstated his prior removal order.26 While in
detention, Arteaga-Martinez voiced his fear of violence in Mexico.27
An asylum officer determined Arteaga-Martinez had reasonable
fear of persecution and torture in Mexico during an interview.28
Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding of removal under Section
regarding class action lawsuits. Id. The two cases have not been consolidated.
15. These entries were as follows: 1) in February 2000, after which he was apprehended and
voluntarily returned to Mexico; 2) in April 2001, after which he voluntarily returned to Mexico
ten years later; 3) in July 2012, where he was stopped at the border and removed; and 4) in
September 2012. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, No. 19-896 (U.S. argued
Jan. 11, 2022) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
16. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 6.
17. Brief for Respondent at 8, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, No. 19-896 (U.S. argued Jan.
11, 2022) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
18. Id.
19. Id. at 8–9.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 6.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (stating that when the government finds a noncitizen “has
reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily[]
under an order of removal, [this] prior order . . . is reinstated from its original date and is not
subject to being reopened or reviewed.”). See also discussion infra III. Legal History.
26. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 6.
27. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 8.
28. Id. at 9.
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1231(b)(3).29 Under this statute, with limited exceptions,30 the
American government cannot remove a noncitizen to a country where
his or her life or freedom would be threatened.31 DHS informed
Arteaga-Martinez of an upcoming administrative review to assess his
flight risk.32 Although the DHS review process did permit his release,33
Arteaga-Martinez was denied release without a hearing a month
later.34
As Arteaga-Martinez’s time in detention neared six months
without a withholding-only hearing, he moved unopposed for a bond
hearing to determine if he could be released while waiting.35 The
magistrate judge noted that in accordance with Guerrero-Sanchez v.
Warden York County Prison,36 because Arteaga-Martinez was subject
to a reinstated removal order and was detained under Section 1231(a),
he was “entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge after
prolonged detention, which is generally after six months of custody.”37
The magistrate judge thus recommended that Arteaga-Martinez
receive a bond hearing.38 The District Court then adopted the
magistrate report and recommendation in its entirety, ordering an
individualized bond hearing in accordance with Guerrero-Sanchez.39
Arteaga-Martinez motioned, again unopposed, for summary
affirmation of the order of the District Court, which the Third Circuit
granted, noting that neither party disputed that Guerrero-Sanchez
controls.40
Arteaga-Martinez received a bond hearing in November 2018, in
which it was ordered that he be released on bond until his withholding
29. Id.
30. The exceptions in this statute are not relevant in this case.
31. 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A) (“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney
General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life
or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”).
32. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 9.
33. See discussion infra III. Legal History.
34. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 9.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding
that Section 1231(a)(6) requires detainees awaiting withholding of removal decisions to receive
impartial bond hearings by immigration judges after six months of detention).
37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at Appendix C, 4a, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, No. 19896 (U.S. argued Jan. 11, 2022) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
38. Id. at Appendix C, 5a.
39. Id. at Appendix B, 3a.
40. Arteaga-Martinez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, No. 19-1054, 2019 WL 13031922, 1 (3d
Cir. Aug. 20, 2019).
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of removal application was resolved.41 To this day, Arteaga-Martinez
has not received a hearing on withholding-only relief: His hearing was
postponed, then rescheduled to August 2021, and is now planned for
May 2023.42
In the interim, Petitioners (the acting director of ICE, the Warden
of York County Prison, the Field Director of ICE, and the Acting
Secretary of Homeland Security) appealed the Third Circuit’s decision
to the Supreme Court in 2020.43 The Court granted certiorari.44
III. LEGAL HISTORY
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides a framework for
removal of noncitizens from the United States.45 The Act prescribes a
certain removal procedure for those who have entered the United
States previously, were removed, but have since reentered.46 Under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), “[i]f the Attorney General finds that an alien has
reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or
having departed voluntarily[] under an order of removal, the prior
order . . . is reinstated . . . and is not subject to being reopened or
reviewed.”47 The statute mandates that the individual be removed
within a period of ninety days, during which they may be detained.48
However, there is an exception for a noncitizen who “expresses a
fear of returning to the country [of origin].”49 In such instances, “the
alien shall be immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview
to determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or
torture.”50 A “reasonable fear of persecution or torture” exists where

41. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 10–11.
42. Id.
43. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 37, at II.
44. Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 210 L. Ed. 2d 1009, 1 (Aug. 23, 2021).
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (describing the general provisions of the Act).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
47. Id.
48. Id. (a)(1)–(2).
49. Id. (b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the
Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”). There are exceptions to this general rule, none of which are relevant here,
but are listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (including items such as if “the alien ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual because of the
individual’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion,” among others).
50. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e) (noting reasonable fear of persecution or torture is to be determined
“pursuant to § 208.31 of this [C]hapter.”).
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the noncitizen “establishes a reasonable possibility that he or she
would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a
reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country
of removal.”51 Once qualified, the noncitizen cannot be removed to the
original country under any circumstance.52
Under this legal regime, the question arises: how long past ninety
days may a detainee be held as their application is evaluated? Section
1231(a)(6) allows the government to continue detention after ninety
days, reading in full:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under [S]ection
1182 of this title, removable under [the INA] . . . or who has
been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,
may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released,
shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).

After the ninety day removal period expires, Section 1231(a)(6)
provides that the government may either release a noncitizen under
supervision or continue to detain a noncitizen who: 1) is inadmissible;
2) is removable (due to status, entry condition, criminal conduct, or
national security concerns); or 3) is a danger to the public or a flight
risk.53 Noncitizens falling outside of these categories are automatically
subject to release after the ninety day removal period, within terms of
supervision.54
For individuals who fall within these categories, the statute does not
expressly prescribe how long they can be detained after the ninety-day
51. Id. § 208.31(c).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove . . . if the Attorney
General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of
the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”). But this provision does not stop removal to another country where there is no
legitimate threat. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2286 (2021) (“[W]ithholdingonly relief is country-specific . . . . It says nothing, however, about the antecedent question
whether an alien is to be removed from the United States.”).
53. See, e.g., Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2281 (“[T]he statute provides that an alien may
be detained beyond the removal period or released under supervision if he is (1) inadmissible, (2)
removable as a result of violations of status requirements, entry conditions, or the criminal law,
or for national security or foreign policy reasons, or (3) a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the removal order.”).
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (providing no means of detention for those falling outside the
prescribed category); Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2286 (“If no exception applies, an alien who
is not removed within the [ninety] day removal period will be released subject to supervision.”).
The terms of supervision include items such as appearing periodically before an immigration
official. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
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removal period has expired.55 But, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme
Court held that Section 1231(a)(6) must be read with an “implicit
limitation,” without which “serious” due process concerns would arise.
The Court elaborated that detention past ninety days must be limited
“to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal
from the United States.”56 The Court identified that a six-month
detention would be presumptively reasonable, but that after six months,
if it is determined that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future,” the noncitizen must be released.57
Importantly, this release does not then mean the noncitizen is entirely
free.58
The Department of Homeland Security has since provided
regulations implementing the Zadvydas understanding of Section
1231(a)(6) in the context of applicants for withholding of removal.
Under DHS regulations, such an applicant may file a written request
for interim release and must show that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”59 The
regulations provide for the possibility of an interview,60 the factors that
may be taken into consideration,61 and the process for a decision by
DHS.62
In 2018, however, the Third Circuit found these regulations
inconsistent with Section 1231(a)(6) in Guerrero-Sanchez.63 The Third
Circuit noted that the regulations created due process issues by placing
the burden on the noncitizen to apply for release, and by providing no
basis for appeal from the decision of a “not ostensibly neutral” DHS
employee.64 The Third Circuit thus concluded the DHS process raised
55. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (providing no period of time).
56. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 701.
58. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (providing terms of supervision a noncitizen is subject to upon
release).
59. 8 C.F.R. 241.13(d)(1).
60. Id. (e)(5).
61. Id. (f).
62. Id. (g).
63. See Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 227 (3d Cir. 2018)
(declining to defer to DHS regulations in part because “[t]he DHS regulations that implement
the Government’s detention authority under § 1231(a)(6) themselves ‘raise serious constitutional
concerns.’”) (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)).
64. Id. (“These regulations . . . provide administrative custody reviews after 90 days, 180
days, and 18 months . . . by DHS employees who are not ostensibly neutral decision makers such
as immigration judges. Importantly, the regulations also place the burden on the alien, rather than
the Government, to prove that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the society . . . and ‘there
is no appeal from [the] . . . decision.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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serious constitutional concerns.65 Consequently, the Court held that
Chevron deference, the typical judicial deference afforded to
reasonable interpretations by an agency of an ambiguous statute,66
could not be applied to the DHS regulations because a court cannot
“defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that raise[s] serious
constitutional doubts.”67
The Third Circuit relied on the canon of constitutional avoidance
to strike down the regulations as inconsistent with Section 1231(a)(6).68
Specifically, the court declined to determine that, even if the DHS
regulations were consistent with Section 1231(a)(6), the statute itself
may be unconstitutional on due process grounds.69 Instead, adopting
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation,70 and influenced by Zadvydas,71 the
Third Circuit held that Section 1231(a)(6) comports with due process72
because it requires detainees awaiting withholding of removal
decisions to receive impartial bond hearings by immigration judges
after six months of detention.73 To continue to keep a noncitizen
detained, the government has the burden of proving that the noncitizen
is a flight risk or danger74 by clear and convincing evidence.75 If the
government fails to do so, the noncitizen must be released under
supervision until their hearing.76
A recent Supreme Court case, Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, may

65. Id.
66. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”). The judiciary must reject administrative interpretations
based on impermissible interpretations of the statute. Id.
67. Guerrero-Sanchez, 905 F.3d at 226.
68. Id. at 223.
69. See id. (“We therefore find that it may be the case that the Due Process Clause prohibits
prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) without a bond hearing . . . . Despite the constitutional
concerns raised . . . we decline to decide whether [] continued confinement violated the Due
Process Clause . . . . We assume that Congress does not intend to pass unconstitutional laws . . . .
We therefore invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance . . . .”).
70. Id. at 224.
71. See id. at 226 (“Indeed, in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court, while interpreting § 1231(a)(6)
in a related context, adopted a presumption that aliens could be reasonably detained without a
hearing for six months . . . .”).
72. Id. at 227.
73. Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2018).
74. Id.
75. Id. n. 12.
76. Id. at 224.
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influence how the Court decides Arteaga-Martinez. In Guzman
Chavez, the Court considered if 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or 8 U.S.C. § 1231
applied to deported noncitizens who reentered the United States and
were ordered removed again, but who sought withholding of removal
based on fear of persecution.77 The Court held that these individuals,
who were in situations similar to Arteaga-Martinez’s, are governed by
Section 1231.78 Notably, but in dicta, the Court stated that under Section
1231, an individual “is not entitled to a bond hearing.”79
IV. PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT
In Arteaga-Martinez, the Supreme Court must examine the Third
Circuit’s interpretation of Section 1231 and decide whether a
noncitizen awaiting a withholding of removal decision is entitled to a
bond hearing by an immigration officer after six months of detention
to determine suitability for interim release. Petitioners contend that the
Third (and Ninth) Circuits critically erred in their common
interpretation of the statute and misused the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance. They further assert that the DHS regulations are valid as
written and should be followed. Their argument has four main
components: 1) the circuit courts misinterpreted Section 1231; 2) new
Supreme Court precedent requires upholding the DHS regulations; 3)
the circuit courts erred in utilizing constitutional avoidance; and 4)
Zadvydas does not require a bond hearing.
A. Statutory Argument
Petitioners argue that the Third and Ninth Circuits not only
misinterpret Section 1231, but rewrite it.80 They find four major
statutory issues with the circuit courts’ shared interpretation: 1) it
creates additional unnecessary legal requirements, 2) it eliminates
certain categories within the statute, 3) it shifts authority between
agencies under the Executive Branch, and 4) by granting additional
rights to noncitizens, it undermines the plain words of the statute.81
First, Petitioners argue that Section 1231(a)(6)’s plain language
“says nothing about six-month cutoffs, bond hearings, exceptions for
noncitizens whose release or removal is imminent, immigration judges,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280 (2021).
Id.
Id.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 10.
Id. at 9–13.
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or proof by clear and convincing evidence.”82 They explain that
Congress knows how to place these requirements into statutes, citing
laws that explicitly require a hearing before an immigration judge83 or
proof by clear and convincing evidence.84 Petitioners argue that, if
Congress wanted to include these requirements in Section 1231(a)(6),
they would have explicitly done so.
Next, Petitioners argue the circuit court decisions ignore key
provisions in Section 1231. Petitioners assert that Section 1231(a)(6)
only applies to certain noncitizens listed in the statute. They contend
that the circuit court opinions only recognize danger to the community
and flight risk as reasons for continually holding someone after the sixmonth period, effectively writing out the other grounds from the
statute.85
Third, Petitioners note that the circuit courts improperly shifted
authority within the Executive Branch.86 In Section 1231(a)(6),
Congress initially allocated enforcement authority to the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”),87 but later transferred it to DHS under 6 U.S.C. §
557.88 The circuit court opinions give power back to DOJ by requiring
that an immigration judge decide if a noncitizen poses a flight risk or
danger, rather than have DHS decide.89
Fourth and finally, Petitioners point to Section 1231(h), which
prescribes statutory construction: “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that
is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its
agencies or officers or any other person.”90 Petitioners believe the
circuit courts created a new right in contravention of this section when
they each found that the statute requires a bond hearing overseen by a
judge in which the government must meet the burden of proof.

82. Id. at 10.
83. See id. (citing as examples 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), § 1229a(a)(1), and §
1232(a)(5)(D)(i)).
84. See id. (citing as an example 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)).
85. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 11. Petitioners list these grounds for holding after
the removal period to include “when the noncitizen is (1) ‘inadmissible’; (2) ‘removable’ for
national-security or foreign-policy reasons or for violating status requirements, entry conditions,
or certain criminal laws; (3) ‘a risk to the community’; or (4) ‘unlikely to comply with the order of
removal’ (i.e., a flight risk).” Id.
86. Id.
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
88. 6 U.S.C. § 557.
89. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 12.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(h).

FAWCETT_COMMENTARY_4.13.22_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

4/14/2022 11:42 AM

NONCITIZENS’ RIGHTS IN THE FACE OF PROLONGED DETENTION

371

B. Supreme Court Precedent
In addition to their statutory arguments, Petitioners cite both recent
and longstanding Supreme Court precedent to support their position.
Specifically, Petitioners assert the lower court interpretation
contradicts the Court’s 2021 decision in Guzman Chavez.91 As noted
earlier, Guzman Chavez concerned whether individuals like ArteagaMartinez fell under the purview of Section 1231.92 The Court in dicta
stated that, if so, such individuals would not be entitled to a bond
hearing.93 Further, Petitioners cite the 1978 case Vermont Yankee v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,94 in which the Court held that,
while agencies could grant additional procedural rights, “reviewing
courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not
chosen to grant them.”95 While there may be circumstances where a
reviewing court could do so, the Supreme Court noted that such
circumstances would be “extremely rare.”96 Petitioners thus argue that
while DHS can create procedures like bond hearings, courts cannot.97
C. Incorrect Use of Constitutional Avoidance
Both the Third and Ninth Circuits used the canon of constitutional
avoidance to read Section 1231 to require a bond hearing.98 Petitioners,
however, note that this canon should only be used when a statute has
many possible interpretations, allowing a court to choose one that does
not violate the Constitution.99 Here, Petitioners assert there is no
plausible interpretation of Section 1231(a)(6) that would require a
bond hearing, and so the circuit courts created, rather than chose, an
interpretation.100 Petitioners emphasize that the DHS regulations do

91. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 14.
92. See, supra, III. Legal History.
93. Id.
94. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 15.
95. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978) (citing United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972), and United
States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973)).
96. Id.
97. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 15.
98. Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2018);
Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2011).
99. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 16 (“Constitutional avoidance ‘comes into play
only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible
of more than one construction[]’ . . . . It helps a court ‘choose between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text.’”) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842–43
(2018)) (internal citations omitted).
100. Id. at 17.
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comply with due process.101 While acknowledging the Due Process
Clause requires a neutral adjudicator, Petitioners contend that
administrative agencies frequently execute both investigative and
adjudicative functions without bias, and assert that Respondent has
provided no explanation as to why ICE cannot do so as well.102
Petitioners conclude that the “existing regulations provide . . . all the
process that the Constitution requires.”103
D. Zadvydas Does Not Require the Third and Ninth Circuit Rules
Finally, Petitioners assert that Zadvydas comprehensively
explained detention time limits present in Section 1231(a)(6).104
Petitioners note Zadvydas held continued detention is impermissible
after removal is no longer foreseeable, and that after six months
without “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future,” the government must either rebut the showing that
removal is no longer foreseeable or release the noncitizen.105 But
Petitioners assert that a bond requirement is not constitutionally
mandated by Zadvydas,106 and that the DHS regulations as currently
written fully address all Zadvydas requirements.107
V. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Meanwhile, Respondent asserts that a straightforward application
of Zadvydas requires the Third and Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
Section 1231, as holding otherwise would make the statute violate due
process. Specifically, Respondent argues that: 1) Zadvydas interpreted
Section 1231(a)(6) to disallow unreviewable prolonged detention; 2)
Section 1231(a)(6) requires either release or a bond hearing after
prolonged detention; and 3) Zadvydas should be upheld, and neither
the DHS regulations nor recent Supreme Court precedent require

101. See id. (arguing Section 1231(a)(6) satisfies the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause and the existing regulations by DHS do not violate the procedural component of
the Due Process Clause).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 21 (additionally noting “[t]o the extent exceptional cases arise, courts could
consider as-applied constitutional challenges to continued detention under Section 1231(a)(6).”).
104. Id. at 22.
105. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 22 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701
(2001)).
106. Id. at 23.
107. See id. at 23–24 (“This case instead involves the procedural protections accorded to
detainees. Zadvydas[] . . . does not speak to that issue. And under this Court’s decisions that do
address that issue, the existing regulations raise no serious constitutional doubts.”).

FAWCETT_COMMENTARY_4.13.22_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

4/14/2022 11:42 AM

NONCITIZENS’ RIGHTS IN THE FACE OF PROLONGED DETENTION

373

otherwise.
A. Zadvydas Interpreted Section 1231(a)(6) to Disallow Unreviewable
Prolonged Detention
Respondent identifies the central holding of Zadvydas to be “that
Section 1231(a)(6) implicitly limits the government’s authority to
detain noncitizens beyond six months.”108 Respondent notes that to
allow prolonged detention would violate the Due Process Clause,
which protects all “persons” within the United States.109 The Zadvydas
Court held that after six months, detention loses its presumption of
reasonability.110 Respondent asserts that the Due Process Clause
concerns at the center of Zadvydas are just as relevant, if not more, in
the instant case.111 Respondent emphasizes that, in his case, there is a
risk of prolonged detention that bears no relation to a valid
government objective such as preventing detainee flight or danger to
the community.112 Prolonged detention here creates “an impossible
choice: [to] remain imprisoned (possibly for years) while the
government adjudicates a right to withholding[-only] relief, or to
submit to immediate removal despite the risk of persecution and
torture.”113 Respondent concludes that the Petitioners’ approach
subjects a noncitizen legally pursing a withholding of removal claim to
a prolonged detention that, in effect, “is no different from
imprisonment.”114

B. Section 1231(a)(6) Requires Either Release or a Bond Hearing After
Prolonged Detention
Respondent next argues that, for Section 1231(a)(6) to be
constitutional, detention beyond six months must trigger either release
or a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.115 Respondent
contends that under Zadvydas, the applicable question for release is
whether removal is “reasonably foreseeable.”116 Respondent identifies

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 14.
Id. at 14–15 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94, 697 (2001)).
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 18.
Id. at 19.

FAWCETT_COMMENTARY_4.13.22_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

374

4/14/2022 11:42 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL.17

that detainees who pursue a withholding of removal “have ‘no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future’
for two reasons: [] the protracted and undefined duration of
withholding-only proceedings, and [] the potential elimination of any
meaningful chance of removal.”117
Withholding-only proceedings are time consuming: On average, the
entire process lasts close to three years when reviewed by an appellate
court.118 Respondent contends that this makes future removal “far from
‘reasonably foreseeable,’” and makes a withholding-only proceeding
“indefinite” because the individual faces a detention of “unknown and
protracted duration.”119 Further, once a noncitizen is successful in his
or her claim, removal is close to impossible.120 Respondent
acknowledges that while removal to a third-party country is plausible,
this outcome only results in 1.6 percent of cases; it is far more likely for
individuals granted relief to live in the United States and legally work
here.121 Thus, Respondent concludes that after a six-month period, there
is more than sufficient evidence to show removal is not “reasonably
foreseeable.”122
Respondent further notes that outside of a national security
context, the Court has never “authorized prolonged detention without
an individualized hearing, before a neutral adjudicator, [and] at which
the detainee has a meaningful opportunity to participate.”123
Respondent argues Petitioners are unable to find an example of the
Supreme Court supporting Petitioners’ position on this issue because
the Court has never done so in light of due process concerns.124
With these constitutional considerations in mind, Respondent

117. Id.
118. Id. at 20 (“The process regularly exceeds six months. A recent study found that detention
following a reasonable fear determination lasted an average of 114 days when neither party
appealed the immigration judge’s decision; 301 days when at least one party appealed and the
BIA issued a final decision; 447 days when the BIA remanded the case and the immigration judge
made a final decision; and 1,065 days when a U.S. court of appeals granted a petition for review.”).
119. Id. at 20–21.
120. See id. at 21 (noting that removal almost never occurs).
121. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 21–22.
122. See id. at 22 (concluding that removal is “virtually certain never to occur” for these
individuals).
123. Id. at 24.
124. See id. at 26 (“The government’s failure to identify a case consistent with its position is
no surprise. Compared to the rights of individuals facing prolonged detention while they pursue
statutory withholding-of-removal relief, the government has (at best) a weak interest in denying
a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. In fact, such a hearing promotes, rather than
compromises, the government’s interests in preventing flight and protecting the public.”).
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concludes that the circuit courts appropriately practiced constitutional
avoidance by interpreting Section 1231(a)(6) as requiring a bond
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.125 Because serious
constitutional concerns would arise from prolonged detention with no
chance for a neutral adjudication,126 and since there is a possible
construction of the statute that requires adjudication, the statute can
be saved from unconstitutionality.127 Respondent emphasizes that “the
bond review contemplated by Section 1231(a)(6) must be performed
by a neutral party, not the jailer.”128 The Third and Ninth Circuits thus
properly interpreted the statute to comply with due process by
requiring immigration judges to oversee bond hearings, since such
judges have traditionally and impartially done so.129
Respondent also argues that the circuit courts’ shared requirement
that a clear and convincing standard be applied during bond hearings
is proper for two reasons: 1) degree of proof in a proceeding is typically
a judicial, not statutory, question;130 and 2) since the bond hearings
would concern a due process issue (civil detention), the burden is
particularly appropriate.131
Lastly, Respondent refutes Petitioners’ claim that the Third and
Ninth Circuits rewrote Section 1231(a)(6) by noting that the Supreme
Court has already significantly interpreted the statute, and that circuit
courts need not adopt a tabula rasa approach to interpretation.132
Rather, courts may continue to faithfully apply and interpret the statute
in light of Supreme Court precedent.133

125. Id. at 28.
126. Id.
127. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 29–30. Citing the Third Circuit’s interpretation,
Respondent asserts there are two textual footholds in Section 1231(a)(6) implying the need for a
bond hearing: 1) two of the grounds that Section 1231(a)(6) gives for allowing continued
detention include finding “a risk to the community or [that the alien is] unlikely to comply with
the order of removal,” an assessment typically determined at a bond hearing; and 2) the statute
provides for “terms of supervision,” which is the function of a bond hearing to determine. Id. at
30.
128. Id. at 31.
129. See Id. at 32 (“Despite the uniform practice, [Petitioners] now argue[] that Congress
could not have intended immigration judges to perform custody reviews under Section
1231(a)(6) . . . . [Petitioners] did not raise that argument below, presumably because it is inapt . . .
. And if there were any question whether Congress intended to eliminate that key due process
protection of a neutral adjudicator, constitutional avoidance would compel the conclusion that
Congress did not.”).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 33.
132. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 34.
133. See id. at 34–35 (asserting that the Zadvydas decision demonstrated the Court’s
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C. The DHS Regulations are an Unconstitutional Interpretation of the
Statute, and Zadvydas Should be Affirmed.
Respondent asserts that the DHS regulations do not solve the due
process issue within Section 1231(a)(6) for two reasons.134 First, the
regulations do not provide neutral review because DHS employees are
not neutral decisionmakers:135 ICE, “as the jailer, cannot be ‘neutral’ as
a matter of law or logic.”136 Second, the regulations place the burden of
proof on the detainee,137 a practice the Court has struck down in similar
cases.138
Respondent refutes Petitioners’ claim that recent Court decisions
warrant a departure from Zadvydas.139 He notes the issue in Guzman
Chavez was whether noncitizens like himself were subject to detention
under either Section 1226 or 1231. Since the Court in that case did not
actually reach the issue of bond hearings, Respondent concludes that
Petitioners improperly rest their argument on dicta.140
Respondent also concludes that Section 1231(a)(6) bars prolonged
detention, either by providing for supervised release or for a bond
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.141 He asserts that if the Court
holds otherwise, on remand the Third Circuit must consider whether
his prolonged detention without opportunity for an impartial bond
hearing violates the Due Process Clause: in other words, whether
Section 1231(a)(6), as written, is unconstitutional.142
Thus, Respondent argues that Section 1231, to be constitutional,
requires a bond hearing, while Petitioners argue that the plain language
of Section 1231 does not permit a bond hearing requirement to be read
into it.
VI. ORAL ARGUMENT
During oral arguments, the Justices focused on several issues. Some

willingness to interpret the statute and that the circuits are within their power to do the same in
line with Supreme Court precedent).
134. Id. at 39.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 41.
137. Id. at 39.
138. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 39 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691
(2001)).
139. Id. at 42.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 44.
142. Id.
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expressed due process-related concerns, while others focused on the
language of the statute, procedural posture, and how to apply caselaw
precedent to the issue at hand.
A. Petitioners’ Argument
During their oral argument, Petitioners identified the question
presented as whether language in Section 1231(a)(6)—that some
categories of noncitizens “may be detained beyond the removal
period”—permits the requirement of a bond hearing after six months
where the government bears the burden of presenting clear and
convincing evidence.143 They asserted the answer is simply no.144 Chief
Justice Roberts asked Petitioners whether the Court had already
determined that the statute can be expanded past its plain terms in
Zadvydas.145 Justice Kagan reacted to Chief Justice Roberts’s inquiry,
noting that the Court is dealing with the same statute as in Zadvydas,
where the Court asserted the word “may” necessarily provides the
ambiguity needed to take constitutional considerations into account.146
In response, Petitioners asserted that Zadvydas is distinct from
Arteaga-Martinez because in the former case, the Court based its
decision on what it considered to be the purpose of Section 1231(a)(6):
ensuring that the noncitizen is present for removal. 147 However,
Petitioners contended that this consideration is not present in the
instant case.148 Justice Kagan immediately pushed back, asking if
Zadvydas did not go further.149 Petitioners responded that even if one
takes the word “may” as an invitation to interpretation, this reading still
does not permit the procedural rewrite proposed by Respondent.150
Justice Sotomayor continued discussion of the Zadvydas holding,
stating that “the basic point of Zadvydas is [that] you really can’t keep
someone indefinitely without a reason,” and concluded by asking if the
143. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, No. 19-896 (argued
Jan. 11, 2022).
144. See id. at 3–4 (asserting that the question answers itself and the lower court should be
reversed).
145. Id. at 6.
146. Id. at 7–8.
147. See id. at 8–9 (“Zadvydas is distinct in an important respect in that there the Court . . .
drew its interpretation from the logic of the statute, and it said the purpose of this statute is to
ensure that the non-citizen is present at the time of removal . . . . And that connection is absent
here.”).
148. Id.
149. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 9–10 (“So Zadvydas seems to . . . think
of itself as extending beyond that very sort of core purpose of inquiry that you referred to.”).
150. Id. at 11.
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Petitioners’ “position [is] that there is no process by which that type of
judgment could be challenged?”151 Justice Barrett similarly wondered
what would happen if a withholding procedure continued indefinitely
or if there was no country available to take a detainee.152
Justice Breyer asked for an estimate of how long it typically takes
the government to find a place to remove someone like Respondent
Arteaga-Martinez,153 before remarking that both Zadvydas and the
case here present the “same situation.”154 Justice Breyer then asked
Petitioners whether, before Arteaga-Martinez obtains withholdingonly relief, they could hold him for as long as fifty years.155 Petitioners
asserted this case is different from Zadvydas, because here, ArteagaMartinez is in detention pending a proceeding, whereas the detainee in
the former case was experiencing open-ended detention.156 Petitioners
also clarified their position, arguing that holding a detainee pending a
proceeding157 is a process that takes on average 157 days, which is within
the six month threshold.158
Justice Breyer noted that Arteaga-Martinez’s hearing is not until
2023, “much more than six months [away].”159 Justice Breyer then
asserted Zadvydas recognizes that “an indefinite, perhaps permanent,
deprivation of human liberty without any [] protection” presents an
“obvious” constitutional issue.160
Justice Sotomayor finished her questioning of Petitioners by
bringing up practical considerations. She noted Petitioners were wrong
to say the “average” case involving a detainee pending a proceeding is
resolved within six months, as this is untrue for many people.161
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor noted that it is “hard to see how
impoverished people, unfamiliar with the workings of this government,
of this country, are going to find lawyers.”162 Justice Sotomayor
concluded by calling Petitioners’ proposed DHS hearing akin to a

151. Id. at 13.
152. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 19–20.
154. Id. at 21.
155. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 23.
156. Id. at 21.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 25–26.
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id. at 27–28. In contrast to this strong language, Justice Breyer then noted he is not
“wedded” to Respondent’s interpretation but wanted to hear what the response was. Id. at 28.
161. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 31.
162. Id. at 32.
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“theore[t]ic[al] offering” of benefit.163
B. Respondent’s Argument
Respondent began his oral argument by asserting that he was in the
exact same situation as the detainee in Zadvydas, and that Section
1231(a)(6) prohibits detention when there is “no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”164 Chief Justice
Roberts asked about Section 1231(h), noting its command that nothing
in Section 1231 should “be construed to create any substantive or
procedural right.”165 Respondent answered that this line of argument
was rejected in Zadvydas,166 but Chief Justice Roberts responded that
this does not mean that Section 1231(h) has been read off the books.167
Justices Kagan and Kavanaugh both expressed worry over the
vagueness of the “reasonably foreseeable future” standard. Justice
Kagan showed concern that Respondent was invoking a fact-based
question—namely, whether he had no significant likelihood of removal
in the “reasonably foreseeable future”—and that fact-based questions
are “not the kind of thing we [the Supreme Court] usually do.”168
Respondent identified this inquiry as a legal test rather than a factbased question.169 Justice Kavanaugh looked for clarification on the
meaning of “reasonably foreseeable future,”170 and emphasized “there
could be chaos unless we say something more specific.”171
Justice Alito asked Respondent to reply to Petitioners’ argument
that reading the bond hearing requirement into the statute violated
Vermont Yankee.172 Respondent answered by arguing that Vermont
Yankee does not bear on the question at hand, but if the Court were to
find that it does, the Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted, as the case would then present a threshold issue
that was never “litigated because of the unique posture” of the case.173

163. Id. at 33.
164. Id. at 33–34.
165. Id. at 35–36.
166. Id. at 36.
167. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 37.
168. Id. at 44.
169. Id. at 45.
170. Id. at 47–48.
171. Id. at 49.
172. Id. at 50 (referencing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)).
173. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 52–54 (“[I]t doesn’t make sense to
decide the logically downstream issue of bond hearings and all the procedural requirements that
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Chief Justice Roberts commented in response that it would not be the
first time the Court took up “the downstream issue before the upstream
one.”174
Justice Gorsuch asked whether the fact that Respondent is
currently released moots his claim.175 Respondent stated that the claim
is not moot because “the government still seeks the power to re-detain
him,”176 noting this may be a better question for the Petitioner.177
Justice Kagan separately remarked that “this Court [could think] about
Zadvydas as . . . a precedent that needs to be applied but not one that
is altogether comfortable and [that] should not be extended.”178
Respondent took Justice Kagan’s comment as an opportunity to clarify
that he is not asking the Court “[to] revisit Zadvydas at all . . . but [to]
apply the . . . core holding of Zadvydas.”179 Justice Thomas asked along
similar lines to Justice Kagan’s comment whether Respondent could
“prevail had Zadvydas not been decided?”180 Respondent frankly
replied that if the Court were to overrule Zadvydas, he would lose, but
that Petitioners have not asked the Court to overrule the case.181
C. Petitioners’ Rebuttal
During rebuttal, Justice Kavanaugh asked Petitioners to elaborate
on their position that “the reasonably foreseeable standard” does not
apply well in detention-pending proceedings, and if applied, would be
a “watershed and upend the immigration system.”182 Petitioners replied
that detention-pending proceedings are very common in the
immigration system, and multiple statutes allow for them to take
place.183
VII. ANALYSIS OF ORAL ARGUMENTS
The Court’s questioning during oral arguments indicated a
significant split in thinking amongst the Justices, but it appears that the
might go into that without deciding the logically antecedent question [], do they satisfy the main
test of Zadvydas?”).
174. Id. at 54.
175. Id. at 57.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 58.
178. Id. at 62.
179. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 63.
180. Id. at 67.
181. Id. at 67–68.
182. Id. at 72.
183. Id. at 72–73.
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Court may ultimately be poised to strip the rights of noncitizens. Chief
Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Thomas seemed to
position themselves squarely with Petitioners. First, Justice Alito184 and
Chief Justice Roberts185 focused on both the clear and convincing
standard and Vermont Yankee, which could enable the Court to rule for
Petitioners without addressing the holding of Zadvydas.
Second, Justice Kavanaugh found the implications of the
“reasonably foreseeable future” standard “chaotic,”186 and asked for
expansion on the “watershed” implications for immigration matters.187
Because the Justice not only indicated distaste with the “reasonably
foreseeable future” standard, an element necessary for Respondent’s
argument, but also focused on the impacts to ICE rather than the
impact on detainees, Justice Kavanaugh likely will vote with Petitioners.
Third, Justice Thomas’s only questions related to whether Zadvydas
was necessary for Respondent to prevail,188 indicating a willingness to
treat Zadvydas as an outlier case, meaning he may side with Petitioners.
Meanwhile, Justices Sotomayor and Breyer indicated they favored
Respondent’s position. Justice Sotomayor strongly criticized the
practical impacts of Petitioners’ argument,189 and while Justice Breyer
indicated he was not “wedded” to Respondent’s argument, he
expressed strong concern about constitutionality190 and emphasized the
similarities between the case at hand and Zadvydas.191
The two swing votes will likely be Justices Barrett and Kagan.
Justice Barrett expressed concern over the possibility of indefinite
detention,192 but also indicated interest in an as-applied constitutional
rule.193 Justice Kagan showed a willingness to consider bond hearings,194
but expressed a discomfort with the Zadvydas holding.195
Finally, Justice Gorsuch’s views remain unclear, as he only asked
about the procedure of the case and indicated that the issue could be

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 50.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 54.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 27.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 20.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 62.
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moot,196 wondering if the issue should be decided under a different
case.197 Since four Justices appeared to favor Petitioners, and only two
seemed to side with Respondent, numbers favor Petitioners in reaching
five votes. Therefore, it is likely that Petitioners will win in ArteagaMartinez.
VIII. ANALYSIS
A better course of action is for the Supreme Court to rule in favor
of Respondent Arteaga-Martinez and find that when removal is no
longer foreseeable, Section 1231(a)(6) requires a bond hearing before
a neutral party, namely an immigration officer, where the government
bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
noncitizen does not pose a danger or a flight risk. It should do so both
because the Due Process Clause requires it and because Petitioners’
argument to the contrary is fundamentally flawed.
The Due Process Clause protects all people in the United States,
regardless of citizenship status. The Fifth Amendment commands, “No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”198 It is no defense for a detainer that a noncitizen
detainee is the person claiming a due process violation. When the
Constitution means “citizen,” it says “citizen.” In fact, the
Constitution’s main, unamended body and the Bill of Rights together
feature the word “citizen” eleven times.199 If the Founders had meant
to restrict due process rights to “citizens,” they would have done so
explicitly. This proposition, applicable to both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses,200 is well understood by the Court.201
196. Id. at 58.
197. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 60.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
199. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have . . .
been seven Years a Citizen”); id. art. I § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have . . .
been nine Years a Citizen”); id. art. II, § 1 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States . . . shall be eligible to the Office of President”); id. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases . . . between a State and Citizens of another State,—between
Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects”); id. art IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States”).
200. The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government, while the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to state governments. Both contain a Due Process Clause.
201. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens . . . . These provisions are universal
in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of
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Perhaps the Court put it best when it said:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of
the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. Even one whose presence in this country is
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that
constitutional protection.202

Although noncitizens, unlike American citizens, are subject to
deportation, their right to due process of law is not diminished:
“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here
are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government. In
the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch . . . must
respect the procedural safeguards of due process.”203
The Due Process Clause has teeth. “Freedom from imprisonment .
. . lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.”204 The “[d]eprivation of liberty, even conditional liberty, is the
harshest action the state can take against the individual through the
administrative process.”205 Because “liberty is the norm, and detention
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception,”206 the
Court mandates that a detainee held by the government before their
case is heard has a right to a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker,207
in which the government must prove need for further detainment.208
This requirement often comes with a heightened procedural standard
of “clear and convincing evidence.”209
The current DHS regulations make a mockery of both the Due
the protection of equal laws.”); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (“[S]ince he is a ‘person,’
an alien has the same protection for his life, liberty and property under the Due Process Clause
as is afforded to a citizen.”).
202. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
203. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added).
204. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
205. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975).
206. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 755 (1987)).
207. Id. at 81 (“In addition to first demonstrating probable cause, the Government was
required, in a ‘full-blown adversary hearing,’ to convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person, i.e., that the ‘arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to
an individual or the community.’”) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 86 (“Similarly, the State must establish insanity and dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence in order to confine an insane convict beyond his criminal sentence, when the
basis for his original confinement no longer exists.”).
209. Id.
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Process Clause and the holding in Zadvydas when they allow a
noncitizen to be held indefinitely. The regulations provide that a DHS
agent makes the determination of whether an individual should be
released before their withholding-only proceeding.210 This procedure
fails to meet the basic standards required by due process. By definition,
a neutral arbitrator must be impartial. Yet, based on ICE’s mission
alone— “to protect America from the cross-border crime and illegal
immigration that threaten national security and public safety”— the
agency prefers caution (e.g., detention) in its decision-making.211 The
agency’s preference for caution indicates DHS arbitrators cannot be
neutral when making decisions about detention and imprisonment,
which unacceptably infringes on imprisoned persons’ due process
rights. In short, when asking for freedom, no one should have to make
the case to their jailor rather than to a judge.
The Third and Ninth Circuits require an immigration judge to
proceed over a hearing after six months of detention.212 In support of
Respondents, former immigration judges submitted a Brief as Amici
Curiae arguing that immigration judges are best equipped to make
determinations at bond hearings based on their experience with
immigration laws.213 These judges made three additional points: 1) long
detentions make it difficult for noncitizens to obtain legal
representation, which is crucial for fair and efficient resolution of a
case; 2) bond hearings would allow the government to prove detention
is necessary while mitigating the harms from detention; and 3) bond
hearings would not impose a significant burden on immigration
judges.214 Further, Petitioners erroneously assert that bond hearings in
withholding-only proceedings would create a “watershed” change in
the legal system.215 In fact, these withholding-only cases account for a
mere 1 percent of immigration-related proceedings.216
210. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(d).
211. U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 2021,
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/immigration-and-customs-enforcement.
212. Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2018); Diouf
v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2011).
213. Brief for Former Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals Members as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, No. 19-896 (argued Jan. 11,
2022) at 2–3 [hereinafter Brief of Former Immigration Judges].
214. Id. at 3–4.
215. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 70 (“If this Court were to hold that
Zadvydas applies to detention pending proceedings, that would be a watershed ruling in
immigration law.”).
216. Brief of Former Immigration Judges, supra note 213, at 7 (“Because one must first
establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture before an asylum officer to qualify for a
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The DHS regulations also wrongly invert the standard of proof,
placing the burden on the detained noncitizen to request review by a
DHS agent. This situation ignores the reality that a noncitizen faces
practical issues while detained. Noncitizens in detention are
significantly less likely to obtain counsel than their released
counterparts, negatively impacting them in the process: Only 14 percent
of those in detention obtain a lawyer, while those who are ultimately
released have legal representation in 66 percent of cases.217 And legal
representation, as one would expect, significantly changes the outcome
of a case: those who obtain legal help during their detention win in their
withholding-only proceeding 21 percent of the time, compared to those
without legal help only winning 2 percent of the time.218
Petitioners believe a detention is not indefinite if there is a date on
the calendar for a withholding-only hearing.219 But ultimately, their
argument’s premise falls on its back. There is no difference between an
“indefinite holding” and a “holding until a withholding-only procedure
takes place” when such procedure is continually delayed. Indeed,
Respondent Arteaga-Martinez’s hearing has already been pushed back
three times.220 Further, data examining the average number of days
spent in detention undermine Petitioners’ assertion that these
procedures happen quickly and under a six-month period.221 In making
their argument, Petitioners make a point in favor of Respondent: If a
noncitizen does receive a withholding-only hearing and a
determination within six months, the due process issue does not come

withholding-only hearing, withholding-only proceedings are relatively uncommon. In recent
years, approximately 3,000 new withholding-only cases have been initiated each year,
representing less than [1] percent of all new cases in immigration court. Moreover, while the total
number of new immigration cases has increased significantly in recent years, the number of
withholding-only proceedings has held steady.”).
217. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNSEL AND NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER,
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL 6 (2020) (“A 2016
study revealed that just 14 percent of individuals held in detention managed to hire counsel,
compared to 66 percent of individuals whose cases proceeded outside of detention.”).
218. Id.
219. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 17 (“Our position is that Zadvydas
is limited to . . . open-ended detention. Zadvydas does not apply to detention pending a
proceeding.”).
220. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 10–11 (noting that the hearing was first
postponed before his release date, then rescheduled to August 2021, and then pushed back further
to May 2023).
221. David Hausman, Fact-Sheet: Withholding-Only Cases and Detention, ACLU
IMMIGRANT’S RIGHTS PROJECT, Apr. 19, 2015 at 2 (showing that days in detention can span from
an average of 114 days in the most simple of scenarios to an average of 1,065 days in the most
complicated).
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into play in the first instance. Instead, it is the failure of Petitioners’ own
processes to comply with the protection of life and liberty that requires
the due process issue be fleshed out.
Respondent correctly argues Petitioners cannot win without the
Court overturning Zadvydas.222 Yet, the Court cannot overturn
Zadvydas without contradicting one of the Court’s longstanding
judicial tenets: Under the United States Constitution, the guarantee
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”223 means that absent special justification,
the government cannot indefinitely detain an individual.224
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has an opportunity to affirm the fundamental
rights at stake in Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez. In American society, the
government must justify the prolonged detention of a noncitizen
before their immigration-related hearing. Petitioners recognize that
current regulations leave room for possible due process violations but
argue that instances of said violations should be resolved on an asapplied basis.225 The system of government detention, however, should
not be one in which due process violations are an expected outcome.
This concept is not particularly radical, and the Third and Ninth
Circuits illustrate this by requiring a bond hearing for detainees, a
procedure traditionally used to determine if detention prior to a
proceeding is necessary. In Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, the Supreme
Court should affirm the Third Circuit and, in doing so, affirm its own
precedent by holding that Section 1231(a)(6) requires a bond hearing
before a neutral arbiter after prolonged detention.

222. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 42, n. 7 (noting amici emphasize that
Petitioners can only succeed by overturning the case, which they did not ask to do).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (emphasis added).
224. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“And this Court has said that
government detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive
‘circumstances,’ where a special justification . . . outweighs the ‘individual’s constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’”) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992), and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)) (internal citations omitted).
225. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 143, at 17.

